Abstract Early biomedical research focused primarily on the study of specific diseases or sets of diseases within small groups of living research participants. Accordingly, the first ethical frameworks governing biomedical research addressed short-term, limited-scope research involving living research participants. Due to recent interest in longitudinal population studies and biobanking, research is increasingly long term. This shift raises several ethical and legal issues concerning the impact of a participant's death on research. This paper offers an overview of these issues in the context of longitudinal biobanking genetic research. Our first part outlines the legal and ethical frameworks that govern the effect of the participants' death on consent. This will be followed by an analysis of the legal and ethical frameworks that govern the secondary use of deceased participants' data and samples and the return of deceased participants' individual research results to biological family members. In our second part, we will review the current literature and discuss the above mentioned issues using the bioethics ''principlism'' theory before concluding.
Introduction
Early biomedical research focused primarily on the study of specific diseases or sets of diseases within small groups of living research participants. Accordingly, the first ethical frameworks governing biomedical research addressed short-term and limited-scope research involving living research participants. However, the death of research participants has become increasingly relevant given the recent growth in longitudinal population studies and longterm biobanking. This trend explains the uncertainty surrounding the fate of previously collected samples and data upon the death of the research participant, even if they were collected under a valid consent. While not only contributing layers of complexity to long-recognized issues, the death of a research participant raises numerous and, as of yet, unexplored ethical and legal issues.
This article focuses on the situation of using identifiable or coded samples and data of deceased persons in which free and informed consent to biobanking research has already been provided, as well as access to identifiable or coded archived samples from deceased persons for research. The latter is necessary as most normative instruments only cover this issue. While the policies of biobanks may foresee the fate of such samples and data, only a few do so (Tassé et al. 2010) .
Genetic research raises a particular set of issues since, by its very nature, it could impact not only on the participant, but also on biological family members. Samples could reveal sensitive information about the entire family. Indeed, while potentially beneficial (e.g. return of research results), genetic information can just as easily harm related family members (e.g. public disclosure).
This paper offers an overview of the legal and ethical issues raised by the death of research participants in the context of longitudinal biobanking genetic research. The first part outlines the legal and ethical frameworks that govern the effect of the death of a research participant on the consent already provided. More generally, international ethical guidelines governing research and biobanking, American and Canadian federal legislation and guidelines governing research, and biobank consent forms and information documents were studied. Following this, the international legal and ethical frameworks governing the secondary use of deceased participants' data and samples and the return of deceased participants' individual research results to biological family members were analyzed. In the second part, we will review the current literature and briefly discuss these issues using the bioethics ''principlism'' theory before concluding.
Methodology
To meet our objectives, we undertook a systematic analysis of relevant international, American and Canadian federal legal and ethical guidelines governing biobanking and genetic research. We conducted a structured analysis of Canadian and American federal legislation and regulations available on the following official web sites: Canadian Legal Information Institute-CanLII (Canada) 1 and USA.Gov (United States).
2 Relevant international documents and guidelines were identified with the HumGen International database, 3 official websites of the Council of Europe 4 and various international organizations governing the ethical conduct of research. We also analyzed published literature from Pubmed 5 and Google Scholar 6 databases. Different variations of the following keywords were used for our searches, either alone or in conjunction: ['research'] and/or ['samples' and/or 'data' and/or 'information'] and/or ['consent'] and/or ['genetics' and/or 'medical' and/or 'health'] and/or ['biobank' and/or 'hospital' and/or 'repository' and/or 'file'] and/or ['secondary' and/or 'use'] and/or ['return' and/or 'results' and/or 'finding'] and/or ['dead' and/or 'death' and/or 'deceased'] . Consent forms and information documents of 54 biobanks were also analyzed, including 52 biobank members of the European Network for Genetic and Genomic Epidemiology (ENGAGE), 7 as well as the Canadian CARTaGENE project 8 and the UK Biobank. 9 This review includes documents written in or translated into English or French, before February 15, 2011.
Results

Review of the legal and ethical framework
Death and consent
For more than half a century, individual, free and informed consent has been considered the ''gold standard'' or the ''pillar'' of research ethics (Elger 2008 (1966) , initial informed consent approaches required the participants to be fully informed about the specific research objectives and expected risks and benefits (e.g. HUGO 1995; WMA 2002; CIOMS 2008; UNESCO 2008; OECD 2009 ). However, the advent of longitudinal biobanking activities has triggered a school of thought favoring broad consent, through which participants consent to the use of their data and samples for a wide spectrum of research, subject to certain conditions of ethics review and security (WHO 1998; WMA 2002; UNESCO 2003; CIOMS 2008; OECD 2009 ). Reaffirmed by numerous international ethical guidelines, informed consent still aims to ensure the dignity, autonomy and privacy of the research participant during the entire course of research (Ries 2007) . The death of research participants, however, alters the framework of informed consent. Although few guidelines directly address this question, partial answers can be found in international guidelines, national legislation and the from governance frameworks of existing biobanks that foresee (or not) the eventuality of death and the disposition of samples and data.
International ethical guidelines Our review of international guidelines identified 22 documents governing biomedical research, the rights of research participants and biobanking activities. However, only four address the effects of death and then mainly in terms of substituted consent, but not the rights of persons already enrolled in research who had died.
The Universal Declaration on the Genome and Human Rights (UNESCO 1997) reiterates the importance of obtaining a free and informed consent prior to research. If the participant is not in a position to consent, however, the declaration requires that it be obtained in a manner prescribed by law and guided by the person's best interest (UNESCO 1997) . Although this section focuses on research with minors or incompetent adults, it is drafted broadly enough to include research with deceased individuals.
The World Medical Association is slightly more specific and states that in some jurisdictions, the law condones substituted consent given on behalf of a deceased person (WMA 2002) . However, it does not elaborate on such substituted consent.
Regarding the post-mortem collection of genetic samples, a 2002 UNESCO preliminary study stated that:
[i]t is generally accepted that the dead should be treated with respect, the content of that respect varying from culture to culture. The DNA testing of the dead is potentially an infringement of privacy rights which the deceased enjoyed during his or her lifetime. There are, however, legitimate purposes which might be served by testing the dead (these may be research purposes (…)). In these circumstances, unless it is known that the deceased held an objection to the procedure, there might be a presumption of altruistic intent and testing might be permissible. (OECD 2009 (45 CFR 46 1996) specifies the requirements for research involving human subjects. It addresses the review of research projects by institutional review boards (IRB) and informed consent. This policy ''applies to all research involving human subjects (…) '' (45 CFR 46 1996) including ''research involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens (…) '' (45 CFR 46 1996) . However, section 45 CFR 46.102(f) defines human subject as a ''living individual''. Therefore, research using samples and data from a deceased person does not fall under the purview of the CFR and these samples and data can be used even if not procured in a consented research project. This distinction is of great importance. It creates parallel regimes for research use of samples and data from living versus deceased participants. However, the use of previously collected samples and data for consented research use is bound by the scope of the initial consent, even after death.
New studies involving deceased participants do not fall under the purview of the Code of Federal Regulations and require neither IRB review, nor informed consent. This American position is contrary to the position advocated by the WHO Genetic databases: assessing the benefits and the impact on human and patients rights (2003), which states that death does not represent the end of ethical responsibilities, but it has the advantage of establishing a clear legal framework for the research use of deceased participants' samples and data.
However, in spite of the CFR, the University of Pittsburgh has established an oversight committee for research with deceased individuals in order to protect deceased patients and their families, to provide guidance to investigators, and to promote uniform and consistent ethical standards and institutional integrity (Wicclair and DeVita 2004) .
In Canada, research involving human participants is mainly governed by the ethical guidelines of research funding agencies. In this regard, the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS 2) (CIHR 2010) is considered the corner stone of research ethics in Canada. On the issue of consent and deceased participants, the TCPS2 provides that a research ethics board (REB) review and approval is required for research involving human biological materials, including materials derived from deceased individuals (CIHR 2010). Moreover, research involving the collection and use of human biological materials requires not only REB review, but also the consent of the deceased participant made prior to death (CIHR 2010). In its absence, an authorized third party can provide consent. However, where a participant has expressed preferences for future research participation, while alive, researchers and authorized third parties must take such directives into account during the consent process (CIHR 2010).
Where national legislation provides no guidance regarding the status of the research participants consent in research after death or where they were not enrolled in research before death but researchers wish to access their 10 State or provincial laws and regulations were not part of this review.
Hum Genet (2011) 130:415-423 417 samples and data, some biobanks have taken the initiative in addressing this issue.
Biobanks' consent forms and information documents Our review of the consent forms and information documents from 54 international, European and Canadian biobanks 11 allowed us to identify only two biobanks whose consent forms or information documents directly address the fate of previously collected research samples and data after the participants' death. First, the Canadian CARTaGENE project has collected in-depth information on over 20,000 Quebecers. It serves as a public health survey and a resource for scientists interested in personalized medicine, genomics and public health.
12 CARTaGENE's information brochure states that ''[t]he death of a participant does not cause his withdrawal from CARTaGENE, unless the participant has so indicated in his will. The participant's data and samples will continue to be part of CARTaGENE's resource and can be used for research. '' 13 This statement does not directly address the wishes of the deceased family members but leaves little room for taking them into account, opting instead to respect the choice of the participant.
The British UK Biobank 14 is also a major longitudinal research initiative with more than 500,000 participants. It aims to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of serious and life-threatening illnesses. Similar to CARTaGENE, UK Biobank's policy states that only the research participant can withdraw consent. After death, UK Biobank only considers the wishes the participant expressed while living. Family members cannot withdraw consent after a participant's death. 15 From an ethical point of view, UK Biobank and CARTaGENE's approaches seem to respect the participants' dignity and autonomy since participants were informed of how their samples and data would be used after their death. When giving their free and informed consent, they freely and knowingly consented to such postmortem use. Moreover, participants could withdraw their consent at any time, even in their will, as in the case of CARTaGENE.
This review of international ethical guidelines, American and Canadian federal legal frameworks and biobanks consent forms and information documents allows us to draw two conclusions regarding the effect of death of participants on their initial consent.
First, only four international guidelines and two biobanks discuss the fate of samples and data after death. In fact, the scarcity of guidelines addressing this issue suggests that policy makers and biobankers either (a) did not foresee the great amount of data and samples from deceased participants to be stored in biobanks; (b) presumed that death would not modify the provisions developed for living participants; or (c) presumed that guidelines addressing the secondary use of samples and data would apply mutatis mutandis for research with deceased individuals sample and data.
Second, the impact of participants' death on their consent varies greatly from one jurisdiction to another. Our study shows that while most international guidelines do not foresee the impact of death, American law only applies to living individuals, and Canadian guidelines barely distinguish between the rights of living and deceased participants. This loophole raises many questions: In the absence of clear legislation or biobank policies, should participation be stopped after the participant's death since it is now impossible to know the participant's point of view since not addressed specifically? Or should it be continued, if one considers that the wishes expressed during the lifetime of the participant represent their wishes after death? And given the particular sensitivity to and familial nature of genetic information, in the absence of a broad consent to future research, should a participant's rights to withdraw or to consent to new research be transferred to the family members or estate of the deceased?
Death and the secondary use of data and samples
The secondary use of previously stored human biological materials from living participants is governed by international frameworks. However, only 5 of the 22 previously identified international guidelines address the secondary use of samples from deceased research participants.
In general, secondary use can be defined as ''the use in research of information or human biological materials originally collected for a purpose other than the current research purpose'' (CIHR 2010). Therefore, any research use of samples and data falling outside the scope of the consent provided should be considered a secondary use. When such secondary use is intended, most guidelines require the researcher to re-contact the research participants in order to obtain fresh consent (UNESCO 2002 (UNESCO , 2003 (UNESCO , 2008 OECD 2009 ). However, the death of a research participant renders re-contact and re-consent impossible.
11 Consent forms and information documents of 54 biobanks were analyzed, including 52 biobanks members of the ENGAGE consortium (http://www.euengage.org/), the Canadian CARTaGENE project (http://www.cartagene.qc.ca) and the UK Biobank (http://www. ukbiobank.ac.uk). 12 CARTaGENE, available through http://www.cartagene.qc.ca/. 13 CARTaGENE Brochure, CARTaGENE, available through http:// www.cartagene.qc.ca/images/stories/cartagene_brochure.pdf. 14 UK Biobank, available through http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/. 15 UK Biobank, available through http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/faqs. php.
Four guidelines indirectly address the secondary use of deceased participants' data and samples. First, a UNESCO preliminary study (2002) stated that the research use of human genetic data requires the consent of the donor, provided that the donor can be traced with reasonable effort. The commentary on this guideline specifies that if getting new consent is impossible, the samples should be anonymized before being used without consent. The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (CIOMS 2002) also stipulated that researchers are constrained by the conditions specified in the original consent when using research records or biological samples for secondary purposes. The commentary on these Guidelines specifies that ''when the research design involves no more than minimal risk and a requirement of individual informed consent would make the conduct of the research impracticable (…), the ethical review committee may waive some or all of the elements of informed consent''. (CIOMS 2002 (CIOMS , 2008 . Seemingly, the death of a research participant renders new consent ''impracticable''.
Then in 2003, UNESCO published the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) . It states that researchers should obtain new informed consent for new research unless the proposed use, as specified by domestic law, corresponds to an important public interest and is consistent with the international law of human rights. When it is impossible to obtain fresh consent, human genetic data may be used in accordance with domestic law or following the consultation of a competent research ethics committee.
The 2008 Declaration of Helsinki (WMA 2008) also specified that consent is normally required for the collection, use and/or reuse of medical research using identifiable human material or data. If consent is impossible to obtain, the research may be done after review and approval from a research ethics committee.
In conclusion, it is important to note that following an application by a researcher, an REB may agree to a partial or full waiver of the consent requirement. Even where waiver of the consent requirement is foreseen, the REB may require the researcher to demonstrate that the deceased research participant did not object to such secondary use samples and data while alive (WMA 2002; CIHR 2010) .
Death and the return of individual research results
The return of individual results of deceased research participants to biological family members needs consideration, since it can be difficult to protect (a) the privacy rights of the deceased person as well as (b) the right of family members to know relevant genetic information while also protecting (c) the right of other relatives not to know.
Although OECD (2009) emphasizes the importance of considering the return of the results of a deceased participant to family members, our study of relevant international guidelines demonstrates that only few address this specific issue.
In general, international guidelines addressing the broader issue of the return of results to family members foresee the potential conflict between respecting the confidentiality and privacy of a living research participants and providing third parties with potentially meaningful healthrelated information (WMA 2002 (WMA , 2006 WHO 2003) . Accordingly, international guidelines recommend that consent forms, as well as other informational documents, describe the limits of the right to privacy (CIOMS 2008) and specify whether the data or research results will be returned to participants (CIOMS 2002 (CIOMS , 2008 UNESCO 2003 UNESCO , 2008 OECD 2009) The WMA Declaration on Ethical Considerations regarding Health Databases (2002) clearly balances the privacy of research participants with the protection of third parties against harm, and states that ''[i]f patients object to their information being passed to others, their objections must be respected unless exceptional circumstances apply, for example where this is (…) necessary to prevent a risk of death or serious harm.'' Similarly, the HUGO Ethics Committee states that the choices and privacy of individuals, families and communities should be respected (HUGO 2002) . However, none of the guidelines address the issue regarding deceased research participants.
On the specific issue of returning the results of deceased research participants to their related family members, OECD (2009) states that the process needs consideration of the competing rights and interests of the deceased individuals and their family members. In another vein, HUGO Ethics Committee states that when there is a high risk of having a serious disorder and prevention or treatment is available, special consideration should be made for access to stored DNA by immediate relatives, for the purpose of learning their own status (HUGO 1998) . The protection of future generations is also addressed briefly by UNESCO, which states simply that the impact of life sciences on future generations should be given due regard (UNESCO 2005) .
In short, the return of research results from deceased participants raises important questions regarding the Hum Genet (2011) 130:415-423 419 apparent contradiction between the protection of research participants' privacy interests and those of the family members. Moreover, there could be a significant discrepancy between the research participant's interest in receiving the results while alive and the interests of surviving family members. According to the HUGO Ethics Committee, the family is the nexus of a variety of relationships and genetic research may yield genetic information that is important to immediate relatives. The decision to refuse to warn at-risk relatives or the failure to provide access after death affects the interests of present and future relatives.
(HUGO 1998).
In conclusion, the protection of the deceased research participants is part of a wider debate which mainly concerns the confidentiality and privacy of research results after death. However, since the value of privacy and confidentiality lie in the ''significant harm that misuse of information can cause'' (WHO 2003) , it seems justified to raise the relevance of this protection and question whether a deceased research participant could really still suffer harm from such disclosure.
Literature review and ethical discussion
Our study of international guidelines, of American and Canadian federal law and of biobanks consent forms and information documents clearly shows that most stakeholders have not yet considered the broader implications of the death of participants on research. While a regulatory answer is still expected, a few authors address this issue.
Literature review
The debate surrounding the continued use of the data and samples of a deceased research participant in research, when consent was obtained from the individual, reveals several conflicts. The discussion of the post-mortem secondary use of those samples and data and the return of the deceased participants' research results to related family members emerges from (1) the friction between the conflicting rights and interests of different stakeholders-particularly the deceased individual and family membersand (2) the uncertainties regarding what weight to accord the rights and interests of the deceased. This can be illustrated by the fact that when the research participant is still living, the primacy of his rights and interests is uncontested (unless exceptions exist under national law). However, death shifts the balance between the deceased and the interests of other stakeholders (WHO 2003) . There is little in the literature on how those interests should be rebalanced after death.
Regarding the rights and interests of the deceased individual, it is essential to note that in most jurisdictions, some rights remain despite death. These rights are usually related to the respect for the deceased wishes (e.g. succession), respect for physical integrity (e.g. disposal of the corpse, organ donation, etc.) and respect for moral integrity (e.g. reputation, dignity, privacy, confidentiality, etc.). In the context of biomedical research, these rights can be translated as the protection against research uses that are incompatible with the deceased ante-mortem expressed wishes and, protection from disrespectful treatment of the body and protection against undue breach of privacy (Wicclair and DeVita 2004; Robinson and O'Neill 2007) even when the expressed wishes are not known. Although the debate on whether dead persons have interests or can be harmed is still unresolved (Partridge 1981; Levenbook 1984; Marquis 1985; Levenbook 1985; Callahan 1987; Grover 1989; Nelkin and Andrews 1998; Fisher 2001; Wicclair and DeVita 2004) , the samples and data of deceased research participants must be treated with respect. They represent the ante-mortem person, at least for related family members.
Regarding family members, their interests may vary depending on their personal preferences and the context of the research. Some family members may be inconvenienced, or even have an ''emotional shock or trauma'' (Wicclair and DeVita 2004) , if they learn that research was performed on a deceased loved one without their knowledge (Wicclair and DeVita 2004) . Some may feel that as long as the initial consent is respected, the expressed wishes of the deceased are respected as well, yet should they be contacted when samples and data of the deceased are used for unforeseen research uses (secondary uses)? On the privacy issue, family members should be protected against disclosure, particularly in the context of genetic research where the research results may either benefit (e.g. learning of a ''preventable'' genetic disease) or harm (e.g. learning of a stigmatizing or unpreventable genetic disease) them (James and Leadbeatter 1996; Quaid et al. 2004; Robinson and O'Neill 2007) . Moreover, this situation raises the difficult issue of protecting the right of one family member to know relevant genetic information, while protecting the right of other relatives not to know (OECD 2009) .
But what rights and interests prevail? In order to balance the rights and interests of both the deceased individual and related family members, we must identify and weigh the key ethical considerations underlying these issues.
Ethical discussion using principlism
Since deceased and living individuals may have competing interests, a brief analysis of these issues through the ethical theory of principlism allows one to identify elements to consider when re-balancing those interests.
Developed in the Belmont Report (The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1978) and articulated by Beauchamp and Childress (2009) , principlism is the dominant research ethics theory in North America. This analytical framework identifies basic principles-the most widely used being autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice-with which to evaluate the ethical character of an action. (Beauchamp and Childress 2009 ) A conceptual toolbox of moral norms, no single principle is considered absolute and the four principles should be given different scope and weight in different contexts (Beauchamp and Childress 2009) .
It must be noted, however, that principlism is a theory of moral decision-making most commonly associated with the practical field of biomedical ethics, concerned primarily with particular, context-specific decision-making. This greatly limits its applicability with respect to broad questions of social policy.
The principle of autonomy advocates respect for the decision-making capacities of autonomous persons. The use of already collected samples and data of a deceased research participant, the secondary use of those samples and data and the return of the deceased research results to family members, all place the autonomy of the deceased in opposition to the autonomy of the living family members.
On the one hand, if the deceased has expressed clear wishes regarding those issues, respect for autonomy requires the researcher to follow expressed wishes. However, in the absence of such expressed wishes, it is impossible to know exactly the expectations of the deceased regarding the post-mortem use of his samples and data. Respect for the autonomy principle prevents researchers or family members from presuming the unexpressed wishes of the deceased. However, if the deceased has directly or indirectly suggested a preference, respect of the autonomy principles requires researchers and family members to act accordingly.
On the other hand, respecting the autonomy of family members can guide the researcher in two opposite paths. First, the family members might want to have a say in the use, secondary use or the return of the deceased's research results. Respect of the autonomy of the family members would then require the researchers to work with the family members to provide consent. Second, where some family members do not want to intervene or receive results, respect for autonomy would prohibit the researcher from disclosing. This situation is particularly problematic when respect for the autonomy of one family member is in opposition to that of another or their wishes may be unknown to the researcher.
Respect for the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence requires the balancing of benefits against the risks of the secondary use of the deceased samples and data and the return of results of a deceased family member. Regarding beneficience, it is difficult to suggest that the deceased individual can benefit from the secondary use and the return of research results. However, the secondary use can benefit persons of the same age or condition while the return of results can benefit family members, either when generally or personally related to their own health.
However, the applicability of the nonmaleficence principle-i.e., avoidance or prevention of harm-for the deceased research participant is more difficult to assess. The literature review demonstrates that the debate on whether the dead persons can be harmed is still unresolved. According to one author, deceased persons can be harmed (Levenbook 1984) . One means of harm could be through inappropriate use of their samples and data, or an inappropriate return of results to family members, which could be considered as maleficent. For another author, the arguments that the dead can be harmed fail to show that these intuitions are genuine moral convictions. Rather, they argue, these are ''judgments we are inclined to make simply because we think of the dead as the person they were antemortem'' (Callahan 1987) . From the perspective of this author, dead persons cannot be harmed and the nonmalficence principle does not apply per se to deceased individuals. Yet, the prevention of harm to others can mandate the use of their samples and data.
With respect to the family members, the analysis of the nonmaleficence principle demonstrates that it can lead in two different directions. First, the use and secondary use of a deceased participant' samples may be maleficient for the family members if they learn that research was performed on a deceased loved one without their knowledge (Wicclair and DeVita 2004) . Regarding the return of a deceased participant research results, it may have harmful consequences for family members that are bound to respect the memory, the reputation or the wishes of the deceased. Family members may also have an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of research results (Callahan 1987) . However, the non-disclosure of research results may also have harmful consequences if relevant to the health of family members, especially if prevention or treatment is possible.
Finally, the justice principle demands the fair distribution of benefits, risks and costs. In this respect, the use and secondary use of deceased individuals' samples and data and the return of research results to family members complies with the justice principle, as long as it allows for better scientific research, better translation of individual research results into clinical practice or if it benefits family members and society in general.
In conclusion, our brief ethical analysis shows that the autonomy principle does not identify an obvious trend in favor or against the use of deceased research participants' already collected samples and data, nor concerning the secondary use of those samples and data and return of research results to family members. However, since the debate on whether dead persons can be harmed is still unresolved, the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence seem to favor the interests of living family members overall. The same holds true for the justice principle, which seems to favor living individuals generally seeing as the deceased person was once a member of society.
Conclusion
Biobanking activities have existed for several decades and inevitably will need to consider the death of participants. Unfortunately, our review of international guidelines shows that few address the particular issues of the effect of death of research participants on their initial consent, the secondary use of a deceased participant's samples and data and the return of a deceased participant's research results to related family members.
As for the effect of death of research participants on their initial consent, the review of American and Canadian federal law and guidelines show that these two countries have chosen substantially different approaches. While the United States has decided to exclude deceased individuals from the definition of a ''human subject''-thereby excluding the requirement for consent-the Canadian approach does not differentiate deceased research participants from living ones and so requires a substituted consent. Moreover, while some biobanks, such as UK Biobank and CARTaGENE, have foreseen the inevitable death of research participants and the fate of already collected samples and data at death, most of the biobanks studied do not anticipate or describe the impact of death on consent.
This lack of specific guidance is also evident when considering the secondary use of the data and samples of deceased participants and the return of their research results to biological family members. Since individual results of biobank-based research are rarely shared even with living participants, the duty to return individual research results of a deceased participant to family members is even more difficult to establish in the absence of a prior agreement. While this is true for individual research results, the return of general research results to family members could be an interesting compromise, offering an opportunity to family members to learn about the general process of the research and demonstrating respect of the deceased and family members.
While some general direction can be found in international guidelines, a number of questions remain, particularly regarding the rights of family members or estate over the samples, data and research results of the deceased.
A brief ethical analysis of this issue shows that principlism can be used to resolve some aspects of the debate. However, it also shows that the emphasis on individual choices and values makes it difficult to generalize these results, particularly when the deceased expressed no choice when living.
The legal and ethical issues raised by the death of research participants in the context of longitudinal biobanking genetic research are of major importance. Illegitimate use of deceased participants' samples and data could weaken confidence in biobanking among participants, family members and society. As mentioned by the CIOMS, ''[t]he challenge to international research ethics is to apply universal ethical principles to biomedical research in a multicultural world (…) '' (2002) . This is particularly true when dealing with death.
